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I.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff-respondent Brickyard Office Associates, Ltd.
("Brickyard"), brought its action to quiet title to the subject
real property and for damages caused by defendant's refusal to
remove a cloud on the title created by a "notice of interest"
recorded by defendant.

Defendant-appellant Mackintosh

("Mackintosh") counterclaimed seeking money damages from
plaintiff based on an alleged oral agreement with his former
employer Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. (the "Corporation").
In response to Brickyard's motion for Summary
Judgment, Judge Noel ruled that Mackintosh's alleged interest
in the real property was barred by the Statute of Frauds and
therefore the "Notice of Interest" filed by Mackintosh was null
and void.
Judge Noel further ruled that Mackintosh had no claim
against Brickyard arising out of an alleged oral agreement with
his former corporate employer.
Contrary to Mackintosh's assertion, Jodge Noel did not
sign the Order and Judgment to which defendant objected.
Rather, after defendant's objection, counsel for both parties
collaborated to prepare a new proposed order and judgment. The
Order and Judgment signed by Judge Noel was approved as to form
by George Fadel, Attorney for Defendant [R.454-459].
Exhibit "A".
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Addendum,

II.

ISSUES

I.
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that an oral
agreement, for which there is no subscribed memorandum/ and by
which Mackintosh claimed an interest in real property standing
in the name of Brickyard Office Associates/ Ltd., is barred by
the Statute of Frauds.
II.
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that
Mackintosh can have no claim, against Brickyard Office
Associates/ Ltd./ a limited partnership, arising out of an
alleged contract between Mackintosh and his former corporate
employer, Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc.
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III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff-respondent Brickyard Office Associates is a
Utah limited partnership.

Owens Affidavit dated October 31,

1986, 1f 2 [R. 248], Addendum Exhibit M B". Brickyard has two
general partners, (1) the Machan Family limited partnership;
(2) the Hampshire Family limited partnership and one limited
partner, Hud Leach.

Owens Affidavit dated, If 2. [R.248-249],

Addendum Exhibit H B M . These three and only these three have
ever been partners in Brickyard.

Owens Affidavit, 1f 2 [R.249],

Addendum Exhibit "B".
Defendant-appellant Dean A. Mackintosh was an employee
of Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., a corporation engaged in
the business of developing and marketing commercial real estate.
The corporation was owned by several individuals
including Mackintosh who owned ten percent of the corporation's
stock.
"C".

Mackintosh deposition, p. 34 [R5.ll], Addendum, Exhibit

At the time of his resignation Mackintosh was slated to

become president of the corporation.

Mackintosh deposition, p.

68 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".
At the end of each year, a meeting was held with each
employee of the corporation, at which time bonuses for the
prior year's service were granted and discussions were held
respecting potential bonuses for the upcoming year.

Mackintosh

deposition, pp. 18-19 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".
The agreement which Mackintosh alleged supposedly
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arose out of one of these potential bonus discussions with his
employers at Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc.
deposition, pp. 18 and 31.

Mackintosh

[R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".

On January 4, 1984, Mackintosh filed a "Notice of
Interest" which clouded Brickyard's title to a parcel of real
property known as the Brickyard Office Tower.

In that Notice

of Interest Mackintosh stated "the undersigned does hereby
assert and claim an interest in that parcel of real property
located at 1245 East Brickyard Road, Salt Lake City, Utah . . .
said interest arises by and through an agreement entered into
by and between the undersigned and the owners of said parcel."
(Legal description omitted).

[R.7], Addendum Exhibit "D".

Mackintosh did not have an agreement with Brickyard.
Mackintosh, in his deposition, refers to three conversations,
one with John R. Hampshire and two with Gary L. Machan, both
officers of Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc.

He contends the

three conversations created an agreement giving him an interest
in the property.

All three conversations occurred while

Mackintosh was employed by Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc.
and arose in the context of that employment.

The last

conversation was in December 1982. Mackintosh deposition, pp.
30-31, 41, and 42 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".
There are no other conversations out of which the
contract is alleged to have arisen. Mackintosh deposition, p.
82 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".
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No partnership was ever formed.

Mackintosh

deposition, p. 116 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit H C H .
Mackintosh had no dealings with Brickyard Office
Associates.

Brickyard Office Associates did not exist until

September 20, 1983, Owens affidavit at 1f 2 [R.248], Addendum
Exhibit "B", nearly a year after the last of the alleged
conversations between Mackintosh and his former employer.
Mackintosh deposition, pp. 41, 42 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit M C".
Defendant-appellant is not a limited partner of
Brickyard Office Associates, Ltd.

Mackintosh deposition, pp.

86, 89, 116, 140 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".
There is no signed memorandum reflecting the alleged
oral agreement. Mackintosh deposition, pp. 81, 128-129
[R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".
IV,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In Utah an oral partnership agreement by which one
obtains an interest in real property standing in the name of
another is barred by the Statute of Frauds.

Peterson v.

Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974); Guinand v. Walton, 450
P.2d 467 (Utah 1969) Later appeal, 480 P.2d 137 (Utah 1971).
Even in those states that recognize an exception to
the Statute of Frauds for partnership agreements to deal in
real estate and share in the profits, the exception does not
apply to an aqreement by which one obtains an interest in the
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property as opposed to a mere interest in profits from real
estate speculation.

Johnson v. Gilbert. 621 P.2d 916 (Ariz.

App. 1980); Plummer v. Foqlev, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (Okla. 1961).
Mackintosh asserted in the court below that he claimed
an oral agreement by which he was to have an interest in land
standing in the name of his corporate employer,
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc.

The court correctly ruled

that the agreement, if it existed, was barred by the Statute of
Frauds.
The court further correctly ruled that the alleged
oral agreement between Mackintosh and his former corporate
employer could give rise to no claim against Brickyard, a
limited partnership.
V,
A.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS BARS MACKINTOSH'S ALLEGED
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
The Statute of Frauds protects certain matters of

great importance involving real estate against fraud and
perjuries.

Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467, 469 (Utah 1969).

Later appeal 480 P.2d 137 (1971).
There is no subscribed memorandum sufficient to
meet the Statute of Frauds requirement relating to Mackintosh's
purported interest. Mackintosh deposition, pp. 80, 81 [R.511],
Addendum Exhibit "C". Therefore, the trial court correctly
ruled that the claimed interest in the property is barred.
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1.

Utah Does Not Follow The So-Called
"Majority Rule". Under Utah law. An Oral
Agreement To Convey A Partnership Interest
In Land Falls Within The Statute Of Frauds.
Mackintosh begins his argument by citing an

A.L.R. annotation in support of the so-called "majority rule"
that a partnership agreement to deal in profits from real
estate need not comply with the Statute of Frauds in order to
be enforceable.

The court need not be concerned with

determining what is or is not the majority rule, however, since
the Utah Supreme Court has shown, in at least two rulings, that
Utah does not follow this so-called majority rule.
The Utah Statute of Frauds, like that of
neighboring states, prohibits creation of an estate or interest
in land, absent a signed deed or conveyance in writing.

Utah

Code Ann. § 25-5-1, Addendum Exhibit "E". Unlike the statute
in most states, however, the Utah statute goes further and
prohibits the creation of contracts concerning or Hin any
manner relating to" real property without a signed deed or
conveyance.
Given the broad scope of the Utah Statute,
an agreement to create a partnership to own real estate is
unenforceable unless a memorandum sufficient to meet the
Statute of Frauds exists.

Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321

(Utah 1974); Guinand v. Walton. 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 1969).
Later appeal 480 P.2d 137 (Utah 1971).
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In Peterson the parties formed a joint
venture to develop a mine.

If the development were successful,

they agreed to form a company in which each would have a
one-half interest.
suit.

When no company was formed, plaintiff filed

The Supreme Court held that signed letters exchanged

between the parties constituted a sufficient memorandum of a
joint venture, without which the agreement would have been
barred by the Statute of Frauds.

524 P.2d .at. 322.

Justice Henriod's concurrence suggested that
the court might follow the so-called "majority rule" and
thereby avoid the Statute of Frauds altogether.

The court

rejected this short-cut to decision, however, and based its
decision on the more difficult ground that the letters
constituted a sufficient memorandum.

Thus, the Utah Supreme

Court has chosen not to follow the "majority rule" now urged by
Mackintosh.
The material dissimilarity between Peterson
and the facts claimed by Mackintosh is that there is no signed
memorandum sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds with
respect to Mackintosh's claimed interest. Unlike the plaintiff
in Peterson, Mackintosh does not have a signed memorandum which
meets the statutory requirements.
Similarly, the Guinand case illustrates that
Mackintosh's claimed interest is unenforceable under Utah law.
In Guinand, an employee of a real estate partnership, was given
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a ten percent ownership in the partnership in payment of
services rendered.

The Supreme Court of Utah held that a

letter signed by the partnership's general partners was
sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds requirement that a
conveyance of an interest in a partnership, the assets of which
consist of real estate, be in writing subscribed by the party
being charged.

450 P.2d at. 469.
Again the material distinction between

Mackintosh's version of the facts and Guinand is Mackintosh's
lack of a memorandum with which to meet the Statute of Frauds.
In Utah, an agreement by which one obtains
an interest in a partnership to own real property is not
enforceable unless the Statute of Frauds is complied with.
Since Mackintosh does not have a signed memorandum,

Judge Noel

correctly ruled that his claimed interest fails.
2.

Because Mackintosh Claims His Alleged
Partnership Agreement With The Owners Of The
Property Gives Him An Interest In The
Property As Well As The Profits. His Claim
Would Be Barred Even In Those States
Recognizing Oral Real Estate Partnerships.
The courts of some states have made an

exception to the Statute of Frauds for partnership or joint
venture agreements concerning distribution of profits or
compensation derived from the sale of land.

Those same courts

have held, as the majority rule, that a partnership agreement
by which one obtains an interest in the real estate itself, as
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opposed to a mere interest in profits, is not within that
exception. Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz. App.
1980); Plummer v. Foqlev, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (Okla. 1961).
In Johnson the court distinguished Eads v.
Murphy, 27 Ariz. 267, 232 P.877 (1925), the case relied upon by
Mackintosh in his opening brief, and held that the reasoning in
that case did not apply to the situation where one partner or
joint venturer was attempting to enforce an interest in the
land as opposed to a share of the profits or compensation
derived from speculation in land.

621 P.2d .at. 919.

Similarly, in Plummer, the plaintiff alleged
that defendant promised him a partnership interest of 25
percent, plus a salary for operating the business contemplated
by the parties.

The court held that the parties had agreed to

later enter into a partnership agreement but the agreement was
unenforceable because it contemplated that plaintiff would have
an interest in real property and no signed memorandum supported
plaintiff's version of the facts. The court held
the statute of frauds applies to an agreement
claimed to constitute a partnership or profit
sharing agreement where, under it, one party is
to have an interest in the lands of the other, or
lands standing in the name of the other. 363
P.2d at 241.
This is exactly what Mackintosh claimed in the court
below.

Mackintosh claimed he had a partnership agreement
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by which he was to have an interest in property which
stood in the name of another.

In his response brief to

Judge Noel, Mackintosh stated:
the "notice of interest" which [Mackintosh]
recorded was a factual statement that the entity
which held legal title, Machan-Hampshire
Properties, Inc. had agreed with him for an
interest in the property. (Emphasis added.)
[R.415].
Mackintosh precipitated this lawsuit by
filing a sworn, notarized statement that he "does hereby
assert and claim an interest in that parcel of real
property located at 1245 East Brickyard Road . . . "
[R.7], Addendum Exhibit "D".
Even Mackintosh's argument before this
Court that Brickyard is not a bona fide purchaser and
therefore received the real property subject to his
interest presupposes that he is seeking to enforce an
interest in the real property that was transferred to
Brickyard and not a mere "share in the profits" agreement
with the corporation.
Because Mackintosh claimed an interest
in the property, the alleged agreement would be barred by
the Statute of Frauds even if Utah followed the so called
"majority rule". The court below correctly dismissed
defendant's claim based upon his alleged interest in the
real property.
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3.

Mackintosh's Allegations Of Part Performance
Cannot Avoid The Statute Of Frauds In An Action
For Damages.
The doctrine of part performance is an

equitable doctrine which cannot be invoked in an action for
money damages.

In McKinnon v. Corporation Of The President Of

The Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434
(Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme Court held "the doctrine of part
performance is not available in an action at law for monetary
damages for breach of an oral contract to convey land."

529

P.2d at 436.
Mackintosh's counterclaim sought only money
damages from Brickyard.

In fact, Brickyard is no longer the

owner of the property and Mackintosh could not seek nor obtain
specific performance.

The doctrine of part performance is

totally inapplicable.
4.

There Is No Part Performance Of This
Alleged Oral Contract Sufficient To Remove
It From The Statute Of Frauds Even If Part
Performance Were Applicable.
In Utah, part performance will remove an

oral contract from the Statute of Frauds only if the alleged
part performance is "exclusively referrable" to the alleged
oral contract. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 279 (Utah
1983).

In other words, the acts constituting the alleged part
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performance must admit to no interpretation but that the
alleged oral contract existed.

Id«

In Martin the plaintiff had labored long,
hard days for over 30 years for a salary ranging from $75 per
month to $375 per month.

The trial court had found these facts

constituted part performance, removing from the Statute of
Frauds an oral agreement by the defendants to convey certain
real estate to the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court reversed

holding that plaintiffs acts were "not atypical of a ranch
foreman's life . . ."

678 P.2 at. 279 and thus were not

exclusively referable to the alleged agreement to convey land.
Similarly, the acts which Mackintosh alleges
as part performance of this alleged oral contract, i.e.,
securing construction financing, and guaranteeing the notes are
not atypical of actions taken by the president and chief

!/• All of the cases cited by Mackintosh in support of his part
performance argument were decided before Martin. In Martin the
Supreme Court distinguished cases such as those cited by Mackintosh
holding:
In all of our cases either the requirement of acts of
exclusive referability was met, or it was relaxed where
there was no evidentiary concern regarding the existence
of a contract. 678 P.2d ££ 279.
In this case the contract claim was hotly disputed and the facts
preponderate against Mackintosh's claim of a contract. Thus,
Martin's exclusively referable rule is the standard any alleged part
performance must meet.
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financial officer of a corporation engaged in the business of
developing and marketing commercial real estate.

See, Bravlines,

Inc. v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah
App. 1987).

In fact, Mackintosh himself testified he signed the

guarantee because he was in the posture of becoming president of the
corporation and such acts were part of his new duties. Mackintosh
deposition, p. 102 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C".
That five of the potential bonus items on the
Exhibit E-4 were realized, while three were not, argues against the
assertion that the exhibit was anything more than a list of
potential bonuses.

The exihibit certainly is not evidence

exclusively referrable to an alleged oral contract that Mackintosh
was to receive everything appearing on the Exhibit.

These facts are

indicative that Mr. Hampshire's interpretation of the Exhibit—that
it was only a suggestion of bonuses that might materialize—is in
fact the truth.
5.

Mackintosh's part performance argument must fail.

Several Writings Referring To Different
Transactions Cannot Be Construed Together To Meet
The Statute Of Frauds Memorandum Requirement.
Just as part performance must serve an

evidentiary function by being exclusively referable to the
alleged oral agreement, before several writings some signed and
some unsigned can be read together to meet the Statute of
Frauds memorandum requirement all of the documents must
reference a single transaction and not be explicable except as
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elements of the alleged oral contract.

Greoerson v. Jensen,

617 P.2d 369, 373 (Utah 1980).
To the trial court, Mackintosh presented
only one document which he argued could be construed with other
documents to constitute a signed memorandum of his alleged oral
agreement.

That document was the April 12, 1983 indemnity

agreement, a document signed at the time of Mackintosh's
resignation from Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. indemnifying
him from all liabilities incurred incident to his association
with the corporation.

Judge Noel properly concluded "the

indemnity agreement, a document prepared at the time of
Mackintosh's resignation from Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc.
as an accommodation to the retiring employee, cannot be said to
have reference to an alleged oral contract made more than one
year earlier."
B.

[R.456], Addendum Exhibit "A".

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT MACKINTOSH
CANNOT STATE A CLAIM AGAINST BRICKYARD OFFICE
ASSOCIATES OR ITS PROPERTY ARISING FROM AN
ALLEGED PRE-PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATION OF THE
CORPORATION.
As a separate and independent ground for

decision, Judge Noel ruled that the partnership could not be
liable for contractual obligations of Mackintosh's former
employer. [R.5], Addendum Exhibit "A".
1.

This ruling was correct.

Mackintosh Is Not A Partner In Brickyard
Office Associates. Ltd.
A partnership is a consensual relationship
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and no partnership is created without the voluntary consent of
all the partners, Utah Code Annotated, § 48-1-15(7).
v. Jeanes, 619 P.2d 369, 373 (Wash. App. 1980).

Ferguson

Moreover, when

the agreement is that a partnership will come into existence at
some future time or upon the happening of an event, no
partnership exists until the agreed time arrives or the event
occurs.

Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82 (Utah 1981);

Bencoe v. Bencoe, 305 P.2d 370, 373 (N.M. 1956).
Mackintosh testified that he was told he
would not be a partner in Brickyard.
pp. 89 and 140.

Mackintosh deposition,

[R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". Mackintosh

further testified that no partnership was ever formed which
included him.

Mackintosh deposition, p. 116.

[R.511],

Addendum Exhibit "C". Brickyard's partners have never
consented to having Mackintosh as a partner in Brickyard Office
Associates, Ltd.

Affidavit of Gary L. Machan dated November

28, 1984, mr 4, 5, and 6 [R.77], Addendum Exhibit "F-.
Even if Mackintosh's version of the
conversations concerning a purported interest were true, they
do not, under the law, entitle him to an interest in Brickyard
or its property.
2.

Defendant-Appellant Has No Claim Against
Plaintiff Arising From Prior Acts Of Its
Partners Functioning In A Corporate Entity.
A partnership is a distinct entity from its
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partners.

Southard v. Oil Equipment Corp., 296 P.2d 780, 784

(Okla. 1956).

A partnership is not liable for the

pre-partnership obligation of its partners that have not been
assumed.

N.L.R.B. v. International Hod Carriers Building &

Common Laborer's Union of America, 287 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir.
1961); Gold Fork Lumber Co. v. Sweanv & Smith Co., 205 P. 554
(Idaho 1922); even if the pre-partnership obligation was
incurred for partnership purposes.

60 AmJur 2d § 161 .a£ 82.

In N.L.R.B. plaintiffs were trying to
enforce against the partnership a collective bargaining
agreement entered into at a time when the business was being
operated as a sole proprietorship by one of the partners.

The

court held the agreement was not enforceable against the
partnership absent a showing the obligation was assumed by the
partnership.
At most, Mackintosh alleged an oral
agreement between himself and entities that have but a
tangential connection to the plaintiff.

That agreement is

clearly not enforceable against plaintiff.

There is no

evidence of any assumption by plaintiff of the alleged
agreement.

On the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that

Brickyard Office Associates refused to recognize the alleged
agreement and Mackintosh was clearly told he would have no
interest in the plaintiff.

Judge Noel correctly ruled

"whatever agreement defendant may have had with someone, it is
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undisputed that he had no agreement with the plaintiff.

The

plaintiff did not exist until September 20, 1983, long after
the conversations on which defendant's contract claim is
based.

A partnership, such as plaintiff, is not bound by the

pre-partnership obligations of its partners or others having
some relationship to the partnership."

[R.5], Addendum Exhibit

"A" .
C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO ADD MACHAN &
HAMPSHIRE AS PARTIES IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT.
Judge Dee denied Mackintosh's motion to bring in

Gary L. Machan and John R. Hampshire as third-party defendants
on September 29, 1986, more than one year ago [R.223, 224],
Addendum Exhibit "G". The time to appeal has long since past.
Moreover, in response to that decision,
Mackintosh filed an action against Mr. Machan and Mr. Hampshire
and that action is now pending in the Third Judicial District
Court before Judge Rigtrup, Case No. C86-6390. Any claims
Mackintosh asserts against Messrs Machan and Hampshire are not
properly before this Court.
Judge Noel ruled in the Order and Judgment,
approved as to form by Mr. Fadel, that if Mackintosh had an
oral agreement with anyone, "it is undisputed that he had no
agreement with the plaintiff."

[R.458], Addendum Exhibit "A".

(A partnership with partners other than Machan & Hampshire).
That was the only issue before Judge Noel and, since Mackintosh
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chose not to appeal Judge Dee's earlier ruling, that is the
only issue before this Court.
D.

DENIAL BY A PREVIOUS JUDGE OF A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT BINDING
ON A SECOND JUDGE.
Defendant cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 for the

proposition that a summary judgment motion, once denied, cannot
later be renewed.

This precise argument was rejected by the

Utah Supreme Court in Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 510 P.2d
1104, 1105 (Utah 1973).

In Hammer, the judge who denied the

first summary judgment motion was deceased.

Some additional

discovery had occurred and a pretrial conference before the new
judge had been held.

The Supreme Court held that in these

circumstances, § 78-7-19 had no application and the court
properly entertained the new motion.

Hammer is

indistinguishable from the posture of this case before Judge
Noel.
E.

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED
Mackintosh's estoppel argument was not made to

the trial court and therefore should not be considered on
appeal.

Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983).

In

any event/ estoppel is inapplicable in this case.
The Utah Supreme Court in McKinnon v. Corporation
of The President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974) held that estoppel will not
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provide relief unless the conduct of the promissor is such that
he clearly manifests an intention that he will not assert the
Statute of Frauds. Mackintosh can point to no action by
Brickyard in which Brickyard represented that it would not
assert the Statute of Frauds.

To the contrary, all of the

evidence shows that Mackintosh was clearly told at every turn
that he would not become a partner in Brickyard Office
Associates, Ltd., and that he would not have any interest in
that partnership.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, plaintiff-respondent
Brickyard Office Associates, Inc. respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the trial court's decision.
DATED:

October

, 1987.
BERMAN & O'RORKE

Blake S. Atkin
50 South Main Street, #1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
2019b
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this ^i£_day of October, 1987, I hereby certify
that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the following:
George K. Fadel
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010

2109b

-22-

A D D E N D U M

-23-

F i L t D i,NJ CLERKS OFFiCS
Salt Lav« r~
V^ fc

J UN 3 0 1987
By

TSTffl

-jurt
Deputy Cierk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES,
a Utah Limited Partnership,

'&K £1/3 Aid- £3Vg
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 84C-04060
Judge Frank G. Noel

DEAN A. MACKINTOSH,
Defendant*

1.

On June 22, 1987, at 9:00 a.m., hearing was held

on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

Plaintiff

was represented by Blake S. Atkin and defendant was represented
by George K. Fadel.
2.

Having considered the written materials on file

relating to this motion and having heard the arguments of
counsel and being fully apprised in the premises, the Court
finds as follows:
3.

On January 4, 1984, at a time when plaintiff

alleges that it was the owner of a parcel of real property
known as the Brickyard Office Tower located at 1245 East
Brickyard Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, (which allegation is
disputed by defendant) defendant Dean A. Mackintosh signed,
swore to and caused to be filed a "Notice of Interest" stating
"the undersigned does hereby assert and claim an interest in

ST.

EXHIBIT A

that parcel of real property located at 1245 East Brickyard
Road, Salt Lake County, Utah, . . . said interest arises by and
through an agreement entered into by and between the
undersigned and the owners of said parcel,"
4.

Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory

judgment that the notice of interest filed by the defendant was
null and void and also seeking damages for slander of title.
5.

Defendant answered alleging an oral agreement

between himself and Gary L. Machan, John R. Hampshire, and/or
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. by which defendant was
allegedly promised a ten percent interest in the development
known as the Brickyard Office Tower as a defense to plaintiff's
complaint.

In addition, defendant filed a counterclaim against

the plaintiff based on this alleged oral agreement between
himself and Gary L. Machan, John R. Hampshire and/or
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc.
6.

Neither John R. Hampshire, Gary L. Machan or

Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. is a party to this lawsuit or
a partner in the plaintiff limited partnership.
7.

Defendant Dean A. Mackintosh testified in his

deposition that there was no signed memorandum of this alleged
oral agreement and the Court has been directed to no memorandum
signed by the plaintiff or any person affiliated with the
plaintiff or this property which in any way relates to the
alleged oral agreement.

The Court was directed by defendant to

2
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an "indemnity agreement" which he alleged could be read with
other documents in the case to constitute a sufficient
memorandum of the alleged oral agreement to comply with the
statute of frauds.

The indemnity agreement makes no mention of

the alleged oral agreement, however.

Instead, the indemnity

agreement was executed at the time of defendant's resignation
more than a year after the conversations on which the alleged
oral agreement is based.

In order for several documents, some

signed and some unsigned to be read together to meet the
memorandum requirement of the Statute of Frauds, they must all
reference a single transaction.

Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d

369, 373 (Utah 1980). The "indemnity agreement", a document
prepared at the time of the defendant's resignation from Machan
Hampshire Properties, Inc., as an accommodation to the retiring
employee, cannot be said to have reference to an alleged oral
contract made more than one year earlier.

Therefore, the Court

finds that it is undisputed that there is no signed memorandum
of this alleged oral agreement.
8.

Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment

seeking a ruling that the notice of interest is null and void
and of no legal force or effect; that the alleged oral
agreement between Dean Mackintosh and Gary Machan, John
Hampshire or Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. is not a defense
to plaintiff's claims for slander of title and for judgment
that defendant's counterclaims, based on an alleged oral

3

agreement between the defendant and Gary Machan, John Hampshire
or Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. is barred by the statute
of frauds and is unenforceable against the plaintiff because
the plaintiff was not a party to that agreement and that the
plaintiff cannot be bound by the prepartnership obligations of
those having a tangential relationship to the plaintiff.
9.

Defendant argued in response to plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment that the alleged oral agreement was
not barred by the Statute of Frauds because the agreement was
that he would receive an interest in a partnership that would
own the real property, rather than an interest in the real
property itself.
10.

The Court concludes that defendant's alleged oral

agreement between himself and Gary L. Machan, John R. Hampshire
or Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., by which defendant is
alleged to have been promised a ten percent interest in the
Brickyard Office Tower project, is barred by the Statute of
Frauds.
11.

Under Utah law, an oral agreement for an interest

in a partnership to deal in real property is barred by the
Statute of Frauds whether or not an interest in the real
property itself is involved.

Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d

321 (Utah 1974); Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 1969);
later appeal 480 P.2d 137 (Utah 1971).
12.

Moreover, even in those states that recognize

4
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oral partnerships to deal in profits from real property, the
Statute of Frauds bars an oral partnership by which one is to
obtain an interest in real property standing in the name of the
other.

Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 919, Ariz. App. 1980;

Plumber v. Fogley, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (Okla. 1961).
13.

The notice of interest filed by the defendant

clearly states that he is claiming an interest in that parcel
of real property located at 1245 East Brickyard Road.

Thus,

defendant's alleged oral agreement by which he alleges that he
was to have a partnership interest is barred by the Statute of
Frauds.
14.

The Court concludes as a separate and independent

ground for decision that the alleged oral agreement cannot be
enforced against the plaintiff Brickyard Office Associates.
Whatever agreement defendant may have had with someone, it is
undisputed that he had no agreement with the plaintiff.

The

plaintiff did not exist until September 20, 1983, long after
the conversations on which defendant's contract claim is
based.

A partnership, such as plaintiff, is not bound by the

prepartnership obligations of its partners or others having
some relationship to the partnership.

N.L.R.B. v.

International Hodd Carriers Building and Common Laborer's Union
Of America, 287 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir. 1961); Gold Fork Lumber
Co. v. Sweary & Smith Co., 205 P. 554 (Idaho 1922).

5
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It is therefore
ORDERED:
1.

That defendant has no cause of action against the

plaintiff and therefore, his counterclaims are dismissed;
2.

That defendant has no right, title or interest to

or in the subject real property and the "Notice of Interest" is
null and void and without legal effect;
3.

That the alleged oral agreement between defendant

and John R. Hampshire, Gary L. Machan or Machan-Hampshire
Properties, Inc. is not a defense to plaintiff's slander of
title claims.

However, defendant is not barred from raising

other defenses to plaintiff's slander of title claims.
4.

That there is no just reason for delay and final

judgment on defendant's counterclaims against the plaintiff is
hereby entered as a final and appealable order.
DATED this

3D
day of
Ouv,!^!-^___ , 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Hon. Frank &. Noel
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form Only:
Ji/,f
/
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Blake S. Atkin 4466
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 328-2200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES,
a Utah limited partnership,

j
]

Plaintiff,

]>

>

«•

!

DEAN A. M A C K I N T O S H ,

i
]>

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN N. OWENS

Civil N o . C 8 4 - 4 0 6 0
J u d g e D a v i d 8. D e e

)

Defendant.
S T A T E OF U T A H

)
: ss .
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
J o h n N . O m e n s , h a v i n g b e e n f i r s t duly

suiorn d e p o s e s and

says:
1.

I am g e n e r a l

counsel for Brickyard

A s s o c i a t e s , L t d . , t h e p l a i n t i f f i n this a c t i o n .
k n o w l e d g e of the m a t t e r s

2.

set f o r t h

Office
I haue

personal

herein.

Brickyard Office Associates, Ltd. is a Utah

limited partnership.

The partnership was formed on September 20,

1983 with the Machan family limited partnership and the Hampshire
family limited partnership as general partners, and Bud Leach as

EXHIBIT B

the sole limited partner.
to the partnership.

No other partners have been admitted

A copy of the limited partnership

certificate and agreement is attached as Exhibit A.
3.

Brickyard Office Associates is presently the owner

of the Brickyard Tower office building located at 124-5 East
Brickyard Road, which is the subject of this lawsuit.

(the

Property).
4.

From August 10, 1981 through December 30, 1983,

the property has been owned as follows:
Date

Grantor

Grantee

Exhibit

August 10, 1981 Brickyard Assoc.

Machan-Hampshire
Properties, Inc.

B

Sept. 22, 1982

Machan-Hampshire
Properties, Inc.

M.H. Properties, a
Utah general partnership

C

April 6, 1982

M.H. Properties

Machan family limited
partnership (50%)

D

April 6, 1982

M.H. Properties

Hampshire family limited

E

partnership (50%)
Dec. 29, 1982

M.H. Properties

Bud Leach (7%)

F

Sept. 23, 1983

Bud Leach

G

Sept. 23, 1983

Machan family
limited
partnership

Brickyard Office
Associates, Ltd. (7%)
Brickyard Office Assoc. (42.5%)

H

Sept. 23, 1983

Hampshire family
limited
partnership

Brickyard Office Assoc. (42.5%)

I

Oct. 3, 1983

Brickyard Office
Assoc. Ltd.

Utah Title Company

J

Dec. 30, 1983

Utah Title Co.

Brickyard Office Assoc.
Ltd.
-2-

K

ooorA

Certified copies of the deeds evidencing these
transactions are attached as Exhibits "B" through "K".
DATED:

October

*5(

1986.

wens

On this ^
day of November, 1986, personally appeared
before me John N. Owens, the signer of the foregoing instrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the_ same

NOTARY PResiding
My Commission Expires:

IX 90b
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

day of November, 1986, I hereby certify

that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. OWENS to the
following:
George K. Fadel, Esq.
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84-010

1190b
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALE LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * *

BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES,
a Utah limited partnership,
Civil No. C-84-4060
Plaintiff,
vs.

Deposition of:

DEAN A. MACKINTOSH,

DEAN A. MACKINTOSH

Defendant.
* * *

Deposition of DEAN A. MACKINTOSH, taken at the
instance and request of the Plaintiffs, at the law offices of
Berraan § Anderson, 1250 Crossroads Plaza, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on the 25th day of September, 1984, at the hour of 9:30
a.m., before LANETTE SHINDURLING, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Utah License No. 122, and Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah.

IB
NOV 231984
*

*

'"

*

FOR RUNG RETURN TO

Associated Professional Reporters
420KearnsBldg /Salt LakeCity.UT 84101/(800322-3441

_^

EXHIBIT

C * \

fILMED
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1
2

Q

And then was there any discussion at that time as to

what your compensation would be after that?

3

A

No*

At that point in July?

4

Q

Yes.

5

A

No. At that point we would see how things worked,

6

how I worked, what the comfort was and regroup and reestablish

7

from there.

8

Q

9
10
11

Did Mr. Machan discuss with you the policy or

procedures of Machan Hampshire Properties with respect to
year-end bonuses?
A

Yes, he did.

Again, this was during the preparatory

12

meetings, the initial meetings. He indicated that based upon

13

production and what was accomplished and so forth that my

14

bonuses would be based and indicated even though I didn't

15

probably anticipate it would be that grand, he indicated that

16

possibly as much as a hundred thousand could be earned by an

17

individual, salary and bonus, based upon how well the company

18

did and what was accomplished.

19

Q

And he told you--

20

A

And that was the reason for my starting work at

21

$20,000. One, to see if there was a fit, if I could produce

22

and if there was a comfort with them, and from that point on

23

we would have salary changes and bonuses thereafter.

24
25

Q

And Mr. Machan told you, then, in July that bonuses

and salary changes would be determined at year-end?

19
A

That's right,

Q

In December?

A

Yes.

Q

And you understood during your employment thatfs

generally how it was done at Machan Hampshire?
A

That's exactly right*

Q

And those year-end determinations regarding bonuses

would be for the year prior, is that right?

That is, for

December, 1980 they would look back to the prior year to
determine what the bonuses would be for production during 1980?
A
in 1981.

Well, that was the case in 1980, that was the case
Also at the end of 1931, because of the comfort level

we had established at that time, they also indicated what my
up-coming bonuses and participation would be.
Q

Ahead of time?

A

Yes.

Q

Before the production and before knowing how you

performed?
A

Well, they knew what projects we had already been

working on and based upon those things coming about and
continuing, those bonuses and partnership participations were
anticipated what they would be, yes.
Q

Do you know of any other instance at Machan

Hampshire Properties where an employee was told what his bonus
would be for the forthcoming year?

30
Q

You had only one meeting in December, 1981 relating

to the specifics of your bonus for 1981 and that meeting was
with Mr. Hampshire?
A

That is true.

Q

Do you recall when in December that meeting occurred?

A

I don't recall.

Q

Early or late?

A

It would have been •• as I recall, it was an evening

meeting.

As I recall, it was a Sunday evening meeting, but my

recollection could be invalid.

But as I recall, it was where

we wouldn't have the time pressures of phones ringing and so
forth and that because of the nature of the topic it was done
in a leisurely manner.
Q

And that was in Mr. Hampshire's office?

A

Thatfs correct.

Q

What was said and by whom, to the best of your

recollection, during that meeting?
A

John just indicated to me what my 1981 salary and

bonus would be.
Q

Let me stop you right there.

Instead of saying that

he indicated something, tell me what he said and what you said
without giving me your conclusions.
A

I am not giving you conclusions.

I'm telling you

what he said.
Q

No.

You said he indicated what your bonus would be.

31
I'm asking you instead of your concluding what the substance
was, tell me what it is he said.
A

Okay.

He said, "Your 1981 salary and bonus, your

salary was $30,000, your bonus will be one percent of the
Oakwood Storage and a thousand dollar cash bonus.ff
Q

Anything else said at that meeting?

A

Yes.

He then indicated to me what my 1982 salary

structure and bonus would be.

One, that I would have -- if I

recall, he indicated that I would have a one percent ownership
in Silver Cliff, he indicated that I would have a one percent
ownership in Cottonwood Towers, but that would not happen if we
did not produce the property or develop the property, if we
resold the land I would not have a participation in that.

He

indicated that I would have a two percent interest in Vantage
Point.

He indicated that I would have a 10 percent interest in

the Brickyard, and he indicated that I would have a 10 percent
interest in all future MH Properties developments, and he
indicated that my salary structure would go to $35,000 in June,
1982.
Q

Your testimony concerning what Mr. Hampshire said

during that meeting has been refreshed by a document, is that
right?
A

That is correct.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 4
was marked
for identification.)

34
A

I certainly made that assumption.

Q

Regardless of what happened during 1982?

A

I don't know if I would say regardless of what

happened.

If we had to sell Silver Cliff or Diagonal or

something, if we had things beyond our control, if certain
things evolved, then we would restructure at that point.

But

certainly my participation would happen the same as what theirs
would happen.

I also forgot to mention I would have 10 percent

of the corporation which I did receive.

I received that before

1982 had terminated so I think the nature, the intent of the
conversation was is that was going to be mine because the
ownership of the corporation happened before 1982 had passed.
Q

You received 10 percent of Machan Hampshire

Properties, Inc.?
A

That's correct.

Q

By way of stock certificates?

A

That's correct.

Q

Did you bring copies of those stock certificates

today?
A

No, I didn't.

Q

Do you have those?

A

I do have them secured.

Q

Where are they located?

A

In a lock box.

Q

Your box?

41
cash bonus of a thousand dollars and another one percent
ownership in Oakwood Storage which he later changed to Oakwood
Office Associates.
Q

Tell me everything that you recall that was said

during that December, 1982 meeting with Mr. Machan.
A

Again, we reviewed--

Q

You tell me reviewed, but tell me what was said.

A

That I would receive the items enumerated by John

Hampshire in December of 1981.
Q

Mr. Machan said that?

A

Yes, that's right.

Q

Did he say, "You'll receive the items designated by

Mr. Hampshire last year", or did he have a list or did you go
over them and itemize them?
A

He had the same list and went over them and

enumerated them.
Q

He had a copy of Exhibit 4?

A

That's exactly right.

Q

So December, 1982, you met with Mr. Machan in his

office?
A

That's correct.

Q

And that was the only meeting in December, 1982

during which a bonus was discussed?
A

To my recollection, yes.

Q

And Mr. Hampshire wasn't present during that meeting?

42

A

That is correct.

Q

And Mr. Machan reviewed Exhibit 4?

A

That is correct.

Q

Were you told that you would receive all of those

things?

A

That is correct.

In addition to that he also

indicated that I would receive a thousand dollar cash bonus
and a one percent interest in Oakwood Storage.

Q

And did you receive any of those items?

A

I received the one percent ownership in Oakwood

Office.

I received the $1,000 cash bonus.

percent Vantage Point ownership.
ownership in the corporation.

I received the two

I received the 10 percent

My June salary increase had

been real ized and they were in the process of effecting the 10
percent ownership in Brickyard.

Q

When was your June salary realized, the increase?

A

I believe it was the beginning of June.

Both Milt

Petersen and myself received that at the same time.

Q

Your salary was increased to $35,000 a year

beginning June 1, 1982?

A

That's correct.

I was paid out of Machan Hampshire

Properties, Inc. and Mr. Petersen was paid out of MH Property
Management, I believe.

Q
Point.

You referred to receiving two percent of Vantage
That's the same thing as Diagonal, is that correct?
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Q

Yes.

A

I don't believe we discussed much about how he felt

about me personally because there had been certain
altercations or whatever between Mr. Machan and myself
subsequent to -- well, just before June of 1982, the period of
time when I was to have been made president of Machan
Hampshire Properties, Inc.

So I don't believe that we

discussed whether he was pleased or displeased with my
performance at that point.

We discussed what my bonus,

additional bonus would be and also the things that they had
discussed with me the previous year for 1982.

He had

indicated that those things were still in place.
I was —

In fact, as

well, in that meeting he just indicated that's what

my salary would be. I don't recall whether he said he was
pleased or displeased.

It was assumed he was still pleased

with my performance though we had still had a few personality
conflicts or he would not have, I presume, given me the
thousand dollars cash bonus and the one percent ownership in
Oakwood Storage.
Q

You said something about in June, '82 you were to

become president of Machan Hampshire Properties?
A

That's right.

Q

And what was that expectation based upon?

A

Mr. Machan's offering the position to me based upon

performance by myself.
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Q

What was the nature of that interest?

A

For work performed, guarantees made and

representations made by the people I was working with.
Q

Exhibit No. 6 refers to an agreement entered into by

and between the undersigned, that is, you, and the owners of
the parcel of real property?
A

Yes.

Q

What was that agreement?

A

The agreement was an oral agreement described --

that we have been describing and discussing this morning as
well as a writing instrument which I have given you as Exhibit
4 including an unconditional guaranty made on my behalf to MH
Properties given and signed for Rainier Bank.
Q

Is there any other thing in writing reflecting the

agreement to which reference is made in Exhibit 6?
A

That's this?

Is there anything else -- I'm sorry.

Q

Is there anything else in writing reflecting the

agreement to which reference is made in Exhibit 6?
A

Other than what I have indicated?

Q

You've indicated Exhibit 4 and your unconditional

guaranty.
A

I don't know if I can discover anything further at

this point.
Q

You know of nothing else in writing?

A

I haven't discovered.

There may be other things

81
which I'm not aware of at this time,
Q

You know of nothing as you sit here now in writing

reflecting that agreement?
A

Just this Exhibit 4 and a duplication of that which

Gary Machan used.
Q

That's it?

A

That's it-

Q

Exhibit 4 was never signed by you or by Mr.

Hampshire or by Mr. Machan, is that right?
A

That is true.

Exhibit 4 is in John Hampshire's

handwriting and Gary Machan had utilized that same document to
make his notes.
Q

You say--

A

So the only writing was by them.

I did not write on

them at all.
Q

You stated earlier that in December, 1981 when you

had this oral agreement.

I take it, that's the oral agreement

you referred to?
A

(Indicating affirmatively.)

Q

Yes?

A

Yes.

Q

That was during your discussion with Mr. Hampshire?

A

And later with Mr. Machan when he asked me if

everything was in place and I said yes.

Again, in 1982 when I

discussed it with Mr. Machan again and said that everything

82
was in place.

So yes, three different occasions , once with

Mr. Hampshire and once with Mr. Machan in '81 and once with
Mr. Machan in f 82.

Q

Well, did you feel that you reached an agreement

during the first meeting in December, 1981 with Mr. Hampshire?

A

Yes.

Q

Was that agreement altered in any way during later

conversations or discussions?

A

Not from my side, no, and not to my knowledge did

they change it.

Q

And as of December, 1981, you were receiving a bonus

of $1,000 cash plus one percent interest in the mini-storage
for services performed in 1981?

A

Thatfs correct.

Q

And you were also as a bonus for 1982 to receive

those things listed on Exhibit 4 under 1982?

A

Thatfs true.

Q

Were you to do anything?

Was there to be anything

done by you whatsoever to receive any of those interests under
1982?
MR. FADEL:

I think he's answered that a few times,

hasnft he?
THE WITNESS:

I really believe I have.

keep hitting the question over and over.

I think you

I don1 t know how

else ta> answer it other than as I've answered it .
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Q

Yes, it is.
MR. FADEL:

Yes, thatfs all right, if you know.

THE WITNESS:

Safford, Bryant Safford.

Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

At what company?

A

Associated Title.

Q

What was your purpose for filing the notice of

interest?
A

When I had approached Mr. Machan in the fall of

1983, I had asked him when we were going to put the
partnership together and he was on his way out from his office.
"Oh", he says "we1re not going to give you any of it."
"What do you mean?"

I said,

He said, "We've decided you didn't earn

it, you're not going to get it." I said, "You understand what
the agreement was when I left?" He says, "Fine, sue me." I
says, "What, and be like every other employee that's worked
for you, have to sue you for it?" At that point I didn't have
the cash resources, I didn't have the time to pursue what
everybody else had gone through with him, so I felt the most
expedient way to preserve my interest in the property was to
file a notice of interest and in so doing we could bring it to
a point and we could formulate what they had presented to me
that they would give to me.
Q

But they never represented to you that you would be

given an interest in the real property, isn't that correct?
A

They represented to me that they would --
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Q

Was it a face-to-face meeting?

A

Yes.

Q

In Mr. Machan's office?

A

I have no recollection of which office it was in. It

was a face-to-face discussion.
Q

But only the two of you were present?

A

I donft even recall that only the two of us were

present.

It could have been discussed in a staff meeting, it

could have been discussed with John and Gary and I together.
Q

What was said and by whom during that meeting?

A

Gary said that I would be required to sign on the

note on the loan with he and John because now I was in the
posture of possibly becoming president of the company and if I
was going to have rewards of participation I would also have
to have the obligation of the liability.
Q

And Mr. Machan told you that was his desire?

A

Yes.

Q

He didn't put it in terms of a requirement by

Rainier?
A

No.

Q

And did you say you did receive a communication from

somebody at Rainier with respect to a requirement that you
execute an unconditional guaranty?
A

Ken Starr -- from the outset it was determined that

I was going to sign with them.

Ken Starr knew that I was
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get -- that my intention was to get their attention so we
could resolve the dispute.
Q

Did you acknowledge to Mr. Gee that you had no

executed agreement with respect to an interest in a
partnership that owned the property?
A

I did acknowledge that.

Nothing had been formed in

the way of a partnership, but I did also discuss with him that
I had written schedules from John and Gary regarding what my
participation was to be.
Q

What in addition to Exhibit 4?

A

I believe you have another exhibit that's been given

by Mr. Fadel to you right there.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 11
was marked
for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

Okay.

You're referring to

Exhibit 11?
A

Yes.

Q

That's a document you produced to us today?

A

That is correct.

Q

Is that document a copy of a document received by

you from Mr. Machan?
A

That is true.

Q

And what did you understand the notations on that

document to mean?
A

Well, at the top he has written "John, Gary and
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told me the partnership would be formulated with my interest
included.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 12
was marked
for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

I show you what has been marked

as Exhibit 12 for identification.

That's a document that your

counsel has produced to us today, is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

Can you identify that document?

A

Yes.

This is an assignment of my partnership

interest in the Vantage Point, in which I agreed to sell my
two percent interest in Vantage Point to MH Properties, and at
this time, this was in May -- well, first of all, do you want
me to elaborate?
Q

No.

I don't want you to read the document.

I just

want you to tell me, that was signed by you, is that right?
A

That's right.

Q

Other than the limited partnership agreement of

Vantage Point, Ltd., we have marked all of the documents
produced by you and your counsel here today?
A

Yes.

Q

And there are no other documents reflecting or

referring to any agreement between you and Mr. Machan or Mr.
Hampshire or Machan Hampshire Properties or any affiliated
companies with regard to an interest that you would have in
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Brickya rd?

A

Not to my knowledge, no.

Q

And you know of no other documents anywhere, whether

in your possession or otherwise?

A

No.
MR. ANDERSON:

Give us a second.

I think we1re

about done.
(Short recess.)

Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

Ifve just got a few more things.

Mr. Mackintosh, do you now claim that you have 10 percent
ownership in Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc.?

A

Do I now claim?

Q

Yes.

A

I don't request any interest in that, no.

it lega lly, yes.

I have 10 percent in it, yes.

anticipate doing anything with it, no.

If I have

Do I

Have I turned it back,

conveye d it to anybody else, no.

Q

Do you anticipate doing that?

A

Legally at this time I have 10 percent interest in

the cor poration.

Q

Do you disclaim 10 percent ownership?

A

No, I do not.

Q

Do you know who signed the stock certificates Mr.

Benson gave you?

A

Reed was -- I don't recall.

I really cannot state.
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that they were putting -- attempting to put a permanent
financing on.
Q

You stopped in Mr, Machan's office?

A

Yes.

Q

For what reason?

A

To -- well, I went to the office to see Mr. Benson

and I went into Mr. Machan's office to again ask him the same
question I had been asking them from the time I left until now,
M

How was the partnership coming along, what are we going to do

on it, whatfs the timing?11
Q

Referring to Brickyard?

A

That's right.

Q

And what was said and by whom at that time?

A

He says,

!,

Youfre not getting a f'g thing.,f

happy to be more graphic if you would like.
"You're not getting a thing."
that.

I said, "Why?"

I'll be

His comment was,

I was shocked that he would say

His comment was, "You don't deserve it.

You didn't earn it so we're not going to give it to you."

I

recited for him what our agreement had been, what my guaranty
had been, et cetera, et cetera.

In fact, he did not even

recite that there had been an indemnification offer given at
that time.

He just said -- the last word he says going out to

the parking lot was, "Sue me", and my response was, "And be
like every other employee has had to sue you to get what you
have offered them?"

We laughed and I said, "I'll go ahead and
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NOTICE OF !HTr»EST

The undersigned does hereby assert and claim «n interest in that
parcel of real property located at 1245 East Brickyard Road, Salt Lake
County, Utah, and wore particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the northerly line of Brickyard
Road, said point being South 537.88 feet and West BS0.21
feet fro* the East qutritr
corner of Section 29, Township
1 South, Range 1 Last, Salt Lake Base and herldian, and
running thence North 88 degrees West ilong said northerly
line of Brickyard Road 30.SO feet to a point of a 616.80
foot radius curve to the right; thence north-esterly along
the arc of said curve and '*1d northerly line 2*2.22 feet
through a central angle of .6 degrees 13 minutes 27 seconds
to a point of compound curve with a 720.00 foot radius curve
to the right; thence northwesterly along the arc of said
Curve and said norther'/ line 201.88 feet through a central
angle of 16 degrees 13 minutes 27 seconds to the easterly
line of Brickyard Condominium; thence along said condominium boundary line North 45 degrees *6 minutes East
463.S2 f e e t ; thence South 41 degrees 32 minutes OS seconds
t m
237.S6 f e e t ; thence South 1* degrees 20 minutes West
176.37 f e e t ; thence South 75 deurees *0 minutes East 25.00
f e e t ; thence South 14 degrees 20 r o u t e s West 138.SO feet
t-o the point of beginning,
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Said interest arises by ano through an agreement entered into by

. . ft
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» 1 £ W

'? £ J^~

•"* between the undersigned and the owners of said parcel.
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A. HACK1ICT0SM

SUBSCRIBED AhD SWOR* TO before me this H+* day of

>-. . %. '. ^ f a f t a v , , \ 1 M
• Personally appeared before me Dean A. Mackintosh.
'^~x*
t h « b . i g > e p W the above instrument, who duW acknowledged t o me that he
p . P . i r U i e t i u J d ^ same.
*

*My towniislon Expires:
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EXHIBIT D

?.

EXHIBIT E

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
25-5-1

Estate or interest in real property.

No

estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
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Ross C. Anderson, 0190
William P. Schwartz, 4404
BERMAN & ANDERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone (801) 328-2200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES,
a Utah limited partnership.
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)
)

DEAN A. MACKINTOSH,

)

Defendant.

)

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
GARY L. MACHAN
C I V I L NOJ u d g e D a v i d B.

C84-4060
Dee

ss.

Gary L. Machan being first duly sworn, hereby attests as
follows:
1.

There have been no adverse claims of interest against

the subject real property (as described in the Complaint), other
than those asserted by Dean Mackintosh.
2.

On January 1, 1984, Brickyard Office Associates was

the sole owner of the subject real property in fee simple.
3.

I have reviewed the summary of title transfers described

in the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion For Summary

EXHIBIT F

oooo

Judgment at page 3.
incorrect.

The summary is misleading, incomplete, and

The transfers of title to the subject property since

1981 were as follows:
On August 10. 1981. the Brickyard Associates deeded the
property

to

Machan-Hampshire

Properties.

Inc.

(Recorded

on

August 27. 1981.) On or about September 22. 1982. MachanHampshire Properties. Inc. deeded the property to MH Properties.
a Utah general partnership.

(Recorded September 24. 1982.)

On

April 6. 1982. 50% of the property was deeded by MH Properties to
the Gary L. Machan Family Limited Partnership, and 50% to the
John R.

Hampshire

Family

Limited

Partnership.

however, were not recorded until April 13. 1983.

These

deeds,

In the interim.

MH Properties deeded a 7% undivided interest in the property to
Bud

Leach

on

December 29.

1982. which

interest

was

recorded

December 30. 1982.
On September 23. 1983, Bud Leach conveyed by warranty
deed his 7% interest back to Brickyard Office Associates, a Utah
limited

partnership.

(Recorded

September 28. 1983.)

Also

on

September 23, 1983. the Gary L. Machan Family Limited Partnership
and John R. Hampshire Family Limited Partnership each conveyed by
warranty deeds a 42 1/2% interest in the property to Brickyard
Office Associates.
October 3,
property

by

1983.

(Both deeds recorded September 28. 1983.)
Brickyard

warranty

deed

(Recorded October 26. 1983.)

Office
in

trust

Associates
to

Utah

conveyed
Title

On
the

Company.

Finally, on December 30, 1983. Utah

Title conveyed the property back to Brickyard Office Associates by

-2-

warranty deed.
4.

Dean Mackintosh has never been a partner in Brickyard

Office Associates, or any other general partnership or limited
partnership with which I have been affiliated which had any
interest in the subject property,
5.

I have never intended, contemplated or understood that

Mr. MacKintosh would ever be a partner in Brickyard Office Associates, or any other general partnership or limited partnership
with which I have been affiliated which had any interest in
the subject property.
6.

The only entities or persons who have ever been general

partners in Brickyard Office Associates are the John R. Hampshire
Family Partnership and the Gary L. Machan Family Limited Partnership.

The only person who has ever been a limited partner in

Brickyard Office Associates is Bud Leach.
7.

At no time have I been advised by Mr. Mackintosh as

to the nature of his alleged interest in the subject real property.

/

Gary £ . \ Machan
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o
., 1 9 8 4 .

b bjyNfrl V v . ^

before

me t h i s

P &

day

of

My Commission Expires:

0079S/112884
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Dale F. Gardiner, 1147
Daniel L. Berman A0304
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144
(801) 328-2200

r.i.

; i , v ft '

A

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

8RICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES
a Utah limited partnership

v.

]
;)
)
j>
>
;)

DEAN A. MACKINTOSH,

;

Defendant.

]I

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO BRING IN
JOHN R. HAMPSHIRE AND
GARY L. MACHON AS THIRD

i

PARTY

DEFENDANTS

Civil N o . C 8 4 - 4 0 6 0
Judge Dauid B. D e e

Defendants Motion for leave to make John R. Hampshire
and Gary L. Machon parties to the above-entitled action came on
regularly for hearing before the honorable David 8. Dee,
District Judge on Friday August 15, 1986 at 11:00 a.m.

George

K. Fadel appeared for the defendant and Dale F. Gardiner,
Berman & O'Rorke appeared for the plaintiff.

The Court having

considered arguments of counsel, and counsels1 memoranda and
determined that defendant's Motion failed to comply uiith Rule
1*, 19, 20 or 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

EXHIBIT G

/'

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
Defendants motion to make John R. Hampshire and Gary
L. Machon parties to/^W^ action be and is hereby denied.
DATED:

M$lfiTr~^/tf

1986.
BY THE COURT:

HoncrfaDle Dauid B. Dee
D i s t r i c t Court Judge. <
H. D?;-ON HiHDLEY
»y
Dar^*
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